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From *Very Weak* to *Very Strong*: Analyzing Password-Strength Meters

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
Password-strength meter/checker

Password:

Good

What is this work about?

We analyzed why is this:



What is this work about?


And why is that (same password):

Dropbox




A password input field with 10 dots representing the strength. Below the field, the text "Very weak" is displayed next to an information icon.

Google



Google password strength indicator. A tooltip box on the left shows "Password strength: Weak" with a red bar and instructions: "Use at least 8 characters. Don't use a password from another site, or something too obvious like your pet's name. [Why?](#)". The main form has "Create a password" and "Confirm your password" fields, both containing 8 dots.

Microsoft




Microsoft password strength indicator. A "Password:" field contains 8 dots. Below it, a "Strength:" section shows four bars: the first is yellow and labeled "Medium", the others are grey.

Twitter



Twitter password strength indicator. A "Create a password" field contains 8 dots and a green progress bar. To the right, a green checkmark and the text "Password is okay." are displayed.

FedEx



FedEx password strength indicator. A "* Create a password" field contains 8 dots. To its right is a green progress bar. Below, text states: "Password must use at least 8 characters and contain one upper case letter, one lower case letter and one numeric character." A red message follows: "You entered a strong password. Longer passwords are even more secure and should include a mixture of mixed-case letters, numbers and special characters."

Our motivations

- 1 Recent studies: meters really guide users to choose better passwords [Ur *et al.*, USENIX Security'12] and [Egelman *et al.*, CHI'13]
- 2 Deployed meters impact hundreds of millions of users
- 3 Built by up-to-billion-dollar IT companies
- 4 They don't seem reliable...

Tested 11 web services/applications



Dropbox

Google™



Drupal™

YAHOO!®

ebay™

twitter 



skype™

PayPal™

FedEx®



Microsoft

Analysis setup (1/3)



- 1 11 dictionaries: 3,895,247 unique passwords

Analysis setup (1/3)




- 1 11 dictionaries: 3,895,247 unique passwords
- 2 Top500, cracking tools (e.g., JtR) worm dictionaries, database leaks (e.g., RockYou)

Analysis setup (1/3)




- 1 11 dictionaries: 3,895,247 unique passwords
- 2 Top500, cracking tools (e.g., JtR) worm dictionaries, database leaks (e.g., RockYou)
- 3 Mangling & leet transformations
password \rightarrow *Password1+* or *p@5\$w0rd*

Analysis setup (2/3)



- 1 Understanding of functionalities (involve some RE)
- 2 JavaScript (whitebox) and/or server-side (blackbox)
- 3 52+ million tests

Analysis setup (3/3)



- 1 Analyze results
- 2 Understand checkers profile
- 3 Find common weaknesses

In theory

Designing PSMs is non-trivial:

- No straightforward academic literature to follow
- Failure of NIST recommendations
- How to deal with password leaks, cultural references?

In practice

- Custom “entropy” based on:
 - Perceived complexity
 - Password length
 - Number of charsets used
 - Known patterns
 - Comparison with dictionary of common passwords (blacklist)
- More entropy \simeq more secure password
- Everyone invents their own algorithm

Meters heterogeneity

- 1 Each meter reacts differently to our dictionaries
- 2 Strength results vary widely from one to another

Example: *Password1*

- Obvious, Very weak, Weak (x3), Poor, Moderate (blacklisted), Medium (x2), Strong (x3), Very strong
 - By Microsoft itself (3 versions): strong, weak and medium!
- 3 Some simple dictionaries score significantly higher than others

Stringency bypass

- Simple mangling rules/leet transformations allow bypassing password requirements

Example: Consider {Top500, C&A, Cfr and JtR}

How many passwords are medium or better?


Web service	Regular	Mangled
Skype	10.5%	78%
Google	0.002%	26.8%

Password policies

- 1 Password policies not often explicitly stated
- 2 Rules for measuring strength unexplained to users
- 3 Differences in policies:
 - Very stringent: assign strengths only for 3+ charsets (FedEx)
 - Promotion of single-charset passphrases (Dropbox)
- 4 Google and Yahoo!, lots of personal info, but lenient policy...

Google checker: some results

Password strength distribution:



Inconsistencies:

- 1 *testtest* is weak
- 2 *testtest0* is strong
- 3 *testtest1* is fair
- 4 *testtest2* is good
- 5 *testtest3* is strong...
- 6 Strength is time-dependent

One checker to rule them all

Password Multi-Checker

Password1

Services	Strength scores	
Apple	Moderate (Blacklisted)	2/3
Dropbox	Very Weak	1/5
Drupal	Strong	4/4
eBay	Medium	4/5
FedEx	Strong	4/5
Google	Weak	2/5
Microsoft (v1)	Strong	3/4
Microsoft (v2)	Weak	1/4
Microsoft (v3)	Medium	2/4
PayPal	Weak	2/4
Skype	Poor	1/3
Twitter	Obvious	2/6
Yahoo!	Very Strong	4/4

Summary (1/2)

Facts:

- Passwords are not going to disappear anytime soon
- Users will continue to choose weak passwords

Current solutions:

- Stringent policies (user resentment?)
- Influence users in choosing better passwords, willingly
 - Provide feedback on the quality of chosen passwords
 - Should be consistent and avoid confusion

Summary (2/2)

Reality:

- 1 Commonly-used meters are highly inconsistent
- 2 Fail to provide coherent feedback, sometimes blatantly misleading
- 3 Often have very ad-hoc design
- 4 Simple transformations not taken into account

What can be done?

- 1 Common API to reduce confusion (e.g., Dropbox with *zxcvbn*)
- 2 Real-time cracking with state-of-the art techniques to assess passwords?
- 3 Passphrases (be careful at simple structures)
- 4 Password popularity, Markov models, PCFG, semantic?

Thanks

To recap:

- 1 Meters less robust than expected from such large companies
- 2 Companies should stop misleading users
- 3 Opportunities for academic research

Contact: `x_decarn@ciise.concordia.ca`


Project URL: `http://goo.gl/0E5Ieu`

O,u3\$T1()|\|5?


Additional slides

Percentage of dic. assigned “good” or +


Base dictionaries:



“Advanced” dictionaries:



FedEx: Password strength distribution



FedEx: Password strength distribution

Very weak? Fine...

FedEx: Targeted dictionary

Refined mangling rules:

- 1 capitalize, append a digit and a symbol
- 2 capitalize, append a symbol and a digit
- 3 capitalize, append a symbol and two digits
- 4 capitalize, append a symbol and a digit, and prefix with a digit

Gives 121,792 words from {Top500, JtR, Cfkr}

- 1 60.9% is now very strong
- 2 9.0% is strong
- 3 29.7% is medium
- 4 0.4% is very weak