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From *Very Weak* to *Very Strong*: Analyzing Password-Strength Meters

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Password-strength meter/checker



What is this work about?

We analyzed why is this:



What is this work about?

And why is that (same password):

Dropbox

Google



Microsoft

Twitter



FedEx



Our motivations

1. Recent studies: meters really guide users to choose better passwords [Ur *et al.*, USENIX Security'12] and [Egelman *et al.*, CHI'13]
2. Deployed meters impact hundreds of millions of users
3. Built by up-to-billion-dollar IT companies
4. They don't seem reliable...

Tested 11 web services/applications



Analysis setup (1/3)

1. 11 dictionaries: 3,895,247 unique passwords

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2. Top500, cracking tools (e.g., JtR) worm dictionaries, database leaks (e.g., RockYou)
3. Mangling & leet transformations

   password $\rightarrow$ *Password1+* or *p@5$w0rd*

Analysis setup (2/3)



1. Understanding of functionalities (involve some RE)
2. JavaScript (whitebox) and/or server-side (blackbox)
3. 52+ million tests

Analysis setup (3/3)



1. Analyze results
2. Understand checkers profile
3. Find common weaknesses

In theory

Designing PSMs is non-trivial:

- No straightforward academic literature to follow
- Failure of NIST recommendations
- How to deal with password leaks, cultural references?

In practice

- Custom "entropy" based on:
  - Perceived complexity
  - Password length
  - Number of charsets used
  - Known patterns
  - Comparison with dictionary of common passwords (blacklist)
- More entropy $\simeq$ more secure password
- Everyone invents their own algorithm

Meters heterogeneity

1. Each meter reacts differently to our dictionaries
2. Strength results vary widely from one to another

Example: *Password1*

- Obvious, Very weak, Weak (x3), Poor, Moderate (blacklisted), Medium (x2), Strong (x3), Very strong
- By Microsoft itself (3 versions): strong, weak and medium!

3. Some simple dictionaries score significantly higher than others

Stringency bypass

- Simple mangling rules/leet transformations allow bypassing password requirements

Example: Consider {Top500, C&A, Cfkr and JtR}

How many passwords are medium or better?

Web service	**Regular**	**Mangled**
Skype	10.5%	78%
Google	0.002%	26.8%

Password policies

1. Password policies not often explicitly stated
2. Rules for measuring strength unexplained to users
3. Differences in policies:
   - Very stringent: assign strengths only for 3+ charsets (FedEx)
   - Promotion of single-charset passphrases (Dropbox)
4. Google and Yahoo!, lots of personal info, but lenient policy...

Google checker: some results

Password strength distribution:



Inconsistencies:

1. *testtest* is weak
2. *testtest0* is strong
3. *testtest1* is fair
4. *testtest2* is good
5. *testtest3* is strong...
6. Strength is time-dependent

One checker to rule them all

Password Multi-Checker

Password1

Services	Strength scores	
Apple	Moderate (Blacklisted)	2/3
Dropbox	Very Weak	1/5
Drupal	Strong	4/4
eBay	Medium	4/5
FedEx	Strong	4/5
Google	Weak	2/5
Microsoft (v1)	Strong	3/4
Microsoft (v2)	Weak	1/4
Microsoft (v3)	Medium	2/4
PayPal	Weak	2/4
Skype	Poor	1/3
Twitter	Obvious	2/6
Yahoo!	Very Strong	4/4

Summary (1/2)

Facts:

- Passwords are not going to disappear anytime soon
- Users will continue to choose weak passwords

Current solutions:

- Stringent policies (user resentment?)
- Influence users in choosing better passwords, *willingly*
  - Provide feedback on the quality of chosen passwords
  - Should be consistent and avoid confusion

Summary (2/2)

Reality:

1. Commonly-used meters are highly inconsistent
2. Fail to provide coherent feedback, sometimes blatantly misleading
3. Often have very ad-hoc design
4. Simple transformations not taken into account

What can be done?

1. Common API to reduce confusion (e.g., Dropbox with *zxcvbn*)
2. Real-time cracking with state-of-the art techniques to assess passwords?
3. Passphrases (be careful at simple structures)
4. Password popularity, Markov models, PCFG, semantic?

Thanks

To recap:

1. Meters less robust than expected from such large companies
2. Companies should stop misleading users
3. Opportunities for academic research

Contact: x_decarn@ciise.concordia.ca

Project URL: http://goo.gl/0E5Ieu

O,u3$T1()|\|5?

Additional slides

Percentage of dic. assigned "good" or +

Base dictionaries:



"Advanced" dictionaries:



FedEx: Password strength distribution



FedEx: Password strength distribution

Very weak? Fine...

FedEx: Targeted dictionary

Refined mangling rules:

1. capitalize, append a digit and a symbol
2. capitalize, append a symbol and a digit
3. capitalize, append a symbol and two digits
4. capitalize, append a symbol and a digit, and prefix with a digit

Gives 121,792 words from {Top500, JtR, Cfkr}

1. 60.9% is now very strong
2. 9.0% is strong
3. 29.7% is medium
4. 0.4% is very weak